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  67 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
INFRASTRUCTURE: ANOTHER O-RING IN 
THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
THIRD WORLD 
James R. Germano, Esq.‡ 
INTRODUCTION 
In his breakthrough 1993 article,1 Michael Kremer developed, what he 
termed, the O-Ring Theory of Economic Development. His theory is based on 
the Shuttle Challenger explosion in 1986,2 and postulates that a relatively small 
aspect of economic development (in Kremer’s view, the production function 
and proper pairing of workers of similar skill), if not planned and executed 
correctly, can be disastrous to the sustainability of a developing economy.3 In 
1986, the Shuttle Challenger had over two million moving parts,4 and count-
less non-moving parts; yet a single rubber seal changed the landscape of 
NASA and space flight forever.5 This Comment asserts that another possible 
“O-Ring” in economic development is a stable telecommunications infrastruc-
ture.  Investing in and budgeting for telecommunications should be a legisla-
tive and economic priority of third world governments to ensure that they stay 
competitive in the global market.  Standard Ricardian theory6 retards the 
                                                 
‡ Attorney, Williams Mullen. I would like to thank Professor Antonio Perez at the Catholic 
University of America, Columbus School of Law, for his guidance and assistance in writing 
this Comment. 
 1 Michael Kremer, The O-Ring Theory of Economic Development, 108 Q. J. OF ECON. 
551, 551 (1993). 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Jacqui Goddard, Nice Runner, 278 Million Miles, One Owner, Just Eur27m; United 
States, THE TIMES (Dec. 19, 2008), 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article5366074.ece. 
 5 Jeff Forrest, The Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster: A Failure in Decision Support 
System and Human Factors Management, DSSRESOURCES.COM (Oct. 7, 2005), 
http://dssresources.com/cases/spaceshuttlechallenger/index.html. 
 6 See infra Part I. 
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growth of third world countries by incentivizing international organizations 
and developed countries to under-invest in their telecommunications infra-
structure.7 With the proliferation of mobile devices in both first and third world 
countries, a reliable telecommunications infrastructure is a necessary staple for 
equalizing economic growth.8 There is a problem, however, in ordinary cost-
based and pro-competitive governmental regimes: they will only exacerbate 
the advantage of first world countries and deepen the third world dependence 
on the developed world.9 Spillover effects and technological pairing will tend 
to only worsen these problems.10 
Part I of this Comment will fully explain the O-Ring Theory of Economic 
Development and how it can be applied in international telecommunications.  
Part I will also specifically focus on the Reference paper,11 which is an outline 
of the goals for international telecommunications as proffered by the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), and how it might be used both to hinder and assist 
developing countries in their economic expansion.  Part II of this Comment 
will discuss the possible counterarguments to the O-Ring theory, and, specifi-
cally, its application to international telecommunications development. Specif-
ically, Part II will discuss leapfrogging and technology transfer programs that 
demonstrate specific anti-O-Ring effects. Lastly, Part III of this Comment will 
discuss the actual and potential O-Ring effects and adherence to conflicting 
international economic policies through a case study of the country of Came-
roon. 
PART I - THE O-RING AND ITS APPLICATION TO INTERNATIONAL 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS DEVELOPMENT 
Kremer asserts that because firms are indifferent as to the skill level of their 
workers (as long as they are uniform), better workers will drift to better firms 
(which are usually located in developed12 economies), allowing those firms and 
                                                 
 7 See infra Part I. 
 8 See infra Part III. 
 9 See infra Parts II and III. 
 10 See infra Part I. 
 11 Telecommunications Services: Reference Paper, Negotiating Group on Basic Tele-
communications, WTO (Apr. 24, 1996), 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/telecom_e/tel23_e.htm [hereinafter Telecom-
munications]. 
 12 The terms “developed” and “developing” countries are used throughout this paper as 
synonyms with first world and third world, respectively. In fact, Black’s Law Dictionary 
defines third world country by directing the reader to Developing Country. Developing 
Country, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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those economies to increase their lead.13 This effect is known as demonstrating 
positive spillover.14 His economic principles are based on a production function 
solving for output, which includes worker quantity and skill level.15 This pro-
duction function is explained in more detail in appendix A.16 
Once Kremer’s hypothesis is proven, it is easy to see how, in the short term, 
workers and firms will happily accommodate the system. First world econo-
mies can afford to import better skilled workers and train their own workers to 
be more efficient.17 This ability, in turn, creates high quality product.18 Third 
world countries are unable to keep pace in this regard, so their product quality 
is lower and thus actually more expensive for their home country consumers.19 
In the short term, this outcome is acceptable (and efficient)20 because develop-
ing countries will happily produce output and provide a service to their citi-
zens, even if the price is somewhat high.21 There is a market for lower-quality 
goods within any sub-economy, so third world countries are satisfied in the 
short term.22 Over the long term, however, considering the disparities between 
the returns to scale on labor23 (and telecommunications), third world countries 
will never be able to catch up; the first step they make toward becoming com-
petitive eventually becomes the limiting factor in their ability to compete glob-
ally.24 The factors that have the greatest impact on their ability to catch up in 
the long term are the combination of several spillover effects and strategic 
complementarities.25 For example, spillover effects in telecommunications in-
frastructure could include, among virtually infinite others, transactional 
                                                 
 13 Kremer, supra note 1, at 556. 
 14 Id. at 570. 
 15 Id. at 553-54. 
 16 Id. at 554. 
 17 See generally UNDP, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT, OVERCOMING BARRIERS: HU-
MAN MOBILITY AND DEVELOPMENT, v, 84 (2009), 
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/269/hdr_2009_en_complete.pdf [hereinafter 
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT] (mapping human migration in an effort to “broaden and 
rebalance perceptions of migration to reflect a more complex and highly variable reality.”); 
Parija Kavilanz, American manufacturers importing workers, CNN MONEY (Mar. 5, 2012, 
11:39 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/03/05/smallbusiness/manufacturing-workers/. 
 18 See HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 17. See also Douglas A. Irwin, A 
Brief History of International Trade Policy, ECONLIB.ORG (Nov. 26, 2001), 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/Irwintrade.html (arguing that economies through-
out history have recognized the importance of exporting manufactured goods). 
 19 Simon Romero & Sara Shahriari, A Foods Global Success Creates Quandary at 
Home: Quinoa Is Now Too Expensive for Many Bolivians, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20 2011, at A6. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Kremer, supra note 1, at 573. 
 24 Nita Rudra, Globalization and the Decline of the Welfare State in Less-Developed 
Countries, 56 INT’L ORG. 411, 417-18 (2002). 
 25 Kremer, supra note 1, at 570. 
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speed.26 
Firms can conduct business more efficiently in developed countries because 
their information is faster and more reliable.27 This will lead to further spillover 
incentives that include, among others, placing more employees in the devel-
oped country and raising the incomes of those employees who wish to relocate 
to faster networks. This simple maneuver will have numerous obvious and 
non-obvious spillover effects in both the short and long terms. 
To explain, assume a relatively small, developed country and a relatively 
large company. If more executives relocate to a newly established global head-
quarters in this developed country and replace mid-level employees, then the 
area surrounding that firm (assumed to be a substantial portion of the country) 
will flourish. Employees will demand larger and more expensive homes, res-
taurants will open or expand, and perhaps an airport is required to shuttle the 
executives to different locations. These are all spillover effects from a fast and 
reliable telecommunications infrastructure. This is what happened when the 
United States, for example, invested in a faster and larger network and Came-
roon could not.28 The developing country will not be able to catch up. In an 
attempt to combat the natural market forces that have led to this unfortunate 
situation, the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) released the Ref-
erence Paper29 to guide development in an egalitarian manner. The internation-
al economic forces at work that triggered that Reference Paper can be analo-
gized to monopoly problems.30 
The ITU Reference Paper 
The WTO investigated the issue set forth herein in 1996 and created one of 
the foundational models for international telecommunications development: 
the Reference Paper.31 The Reference Paper is a brief but influential work that 
was created to serve as a reference for international telecommunications law 
and development.32 It was “the first international document that embodies con-
cepts and elements of telecommunications policy and regulations.”33 It pro-
                                                 
 26 See, e.g., ICT, THE WORLD IN 2010: THE RISE OF 3G 7 (2010) http://www.itu.int/ITU-
D/ict/material/FactsFigures2010.pdf. 
 27 Gordon Hanson, The Globalization of Production, NBER (2001) 
http://www.nber.org/reporter/spring01/hanson.html. 
 28 See infra Part III. 
 29 Telecommunications, supra note 11. 
 30 See infra Part I. 
 31 Telecommunications, supra note 11. 
 32 Boutheina Guermazi, Exploring the Reference Paper on Regulatory Principles 1 
(2002) (unpublished comment) (on file with WTO). 
 33 Id. 
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vides “definitions and principles on the regulatory framework for the basic 
telecommunications services.”34 In addition to advancing relevant definitions, 
the Reference Paper has six focal points: competitive safeguards, interconnec-
tion, universal service, public availability of licensing criteria, independent 
regulators, and allocation of scarce resources.35 These six headings outline the 
goals of the WTO in assisting and regulating international telecommunications 
development.  According to leading scholars: 
The objective of the reference paper is twofold. First, it aims to provide for-
eign service providers with regulatory safeguards to guarantee that monopolies 
or former monopolies do not abuse their market power to undermine competi-
tion. Second, it aims to provide a harmonized set of regulations in order to 
minimize the phenomenon of asymmetric regulation.36 
Similar to this Comment, the Reference Paper was created not to focus on 
combating the monopolization of the telecommunications industry per se, but 
rather “on the anti-competitive practices of major suppliers in a particular mar-
ket.”37 If a first world country has the ability to control the terms of use of their 
product, or their donation, the Reference Paper considers them a “major sup-
plier.”38 To compare to modern U.S. antitrust law, this approach is similar to 
the methods of dealing with monopolies and, specifically, group boycotts or 
exclusionary practices.39 While it begins to address issues of anticompetitive 
practices and informational asymmetries, this Comment asserts that it falls 
short in fully providing developing countries with the protection they need. 
Antitrust law is an appropriate lens for this evaluation because it is econom-
ic in nature, practical, and provides specific incentives that would be helpful in 
providing assistance to third world countries.40 At a very basic level, antitrust 
law is concerned with fairness.41 The benefits of allowing international tele-
communications law to follow the basic rubric of antitrust law are multiple. 
However, for clarity this Comment will discuss three in detail: (1) incentive 
rationale coupled with risk aversion, (2) the existence of per se violations for 
group boycotts and horizontal restraints of trade, and (3) the fact-specific ap-
proach used to evaluate monopolistic behavior, specifically within the realm of 
natural monopolies. 
                                                 
 34 Telecommunications, supra note 11. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Guermazi, supra note 32. 
 37 Id. at 2. 
 38 See id. at 3 (describing “major supplier”). 
 39 CHARLES J. GOETZ & FRED S. MCCHESNEY, ANTITRUST LAW: INTERPRETATION AND 
IMPLEMENTATION 394 (Robert Clark et al. eds., 4th ed. 2009). 
 40 RICHARD A. POSNER, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 379 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 
8th ed. 2011). 
 41 GOETZ, supra note 39, at 10-11. 
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The first reason why an antitrust law approach would be well suited to con-
quer the difficulties associated with an expanding global telecommunications 
industry is rooted in incentive theory. Incentive regulation is a recognized and 
relatively laissez-faire form of governmental control.42 The threat of natural 
monopolies, as well as economic monopolies, is real in the telecommunica-
tions industry.43 Natural monopolies demonstrate three main characteristics: (1) 
high fixed costs, (2) low marginal cost, and (3) a decreasing marginal cost 
curve through the point at which it crosses the average cost curve.44 All three of 
these factors are present in the telecommunications industry, and, in fact, any 
industry that can be classified as a public carrier.45 First, the fixed costs associ-
ated with telecommunications infrastructure are high.46 These fixed costs are 
often high enough to be prohibitive.47 Second, demonstrating the low marginal 
costs of the industry then becomes almost intuitive: the high fixed costs in-
volve mainly start-up costs, and after the lines have been laid or satellites have 
been sent to orbit, the additional cost of adding the marginal user ‘N’ is negli-
gible.48 Third, the cost of adding marginal user ‘N+1’ is less than that of ‘N’ 
because with more “line”49 that is added, it becomes easier to add further con-
nections.50 Thus, the telecommunication industry shows all of the classic symp-
toms of a market highly susceptible to natural monopolization. With this sus-
ceptibility comes the danger of artificially high prices.51 One way to address 
this problem is through Incentive Regulation.52 
We should, as a policy matter, encourage both efficient behavior and effi-
cient outcomes. One of the benefits of Incentive Regulation is that it supports 
this notion.53 Policies that tend to encourage inefficient entry miss the point of 
economic regulation.54 Efficient economies are meritocracies and they should 
                                                 
 42 POSNER, supra note 40, at 374. 
 43 See GOETZ, supra note 39, at 378 (stating that a natural monopoly is “a situation 
wherein the economic of scale are so strong that a single provider will almost inevitably 
come to dominate the ‘market.”). 
 44 POSNER, supra note 40, at 367-68. 
 45 Id. at 368-69. 
 46 Id. at 367. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Here, read “line, Internet connection, satellite connection, etc.” 
 50 For an example of low marginal costs, imagine adding one additional home to an 
existing power grid.  The costs of laying an additional few feet of line to a massive structure 
are relatively negligible. 
 51 POSNER, supra note 40, at 369. 
 52 Id. at 374. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. at 369. 
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be treated as such.55 A firm should not be punished for having a low cost struc-
ture subject to legal limitations imposed by, for example, the Sherman Act56 
and Clayton Act.57 Incentive Regulation “permit[s] rate changes based on 
changes in an industrywide [sic] cost index.”58 This rubric would allow firms to 
benefit from an external increase in cost by subjecting their permitted price-
increases to reflect those external increases in cost.59 To apply this method to 
telecommunications, we can assume that a natural resource is used in the con-
struction and repair of all telecommunications lines; silicone in fiber-optic ca-
bles, for example. If the price of this raw material were to increase by $1 per 
pound in a given time period, then naturally monopolistic firms could increase 
their prices to reflect this change without ramifications.60 
The Economics of the O-Ring’s Application in International 
Telecommunication 
Ricardian theory is based on comparative advantage.61 Comparative ad-
vantage is a situation in which one supplier can produce something at a lower 
cost than another supplier.62 Given a few simplifying assumptions,63 Ricardian 
                                                 
 55 GOETZ, supra note 39. 
 56 See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2012) (“Every contract, combination in 
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the 
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”). 
 57 15 U.S.C. § 13(a). 
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, 
either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of com-
modities of like grade and quality, where either or any of the purchases involved in such 
discrimination are in commerce, where such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or 
resale within the United States. . . where the effect of such discrimination may be substan-
tially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to in-
jure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly re-
ceives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them. . . 
Id. 
 58 POSNER, supra note 40, at 375. 
 59 Id. 
 60 See id. This example is based on Judge Posner’s explanation of Incentive Regulation. 
 61 STEVE SURANOVIC, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THEORY AND POLICY, V. 1.0, THE RICARD-
IAN THEORY OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE FLAT, Ch. 2 (2016) (ebook). 
 62 Lauren F. Landsbur, Comparative Advantage, An Economics by Topic detail, THE 
LIBR. OF ECON. & LIBERTY, 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Topics/Details/comparativeadvantage.html (last visited Oct. 
23, 2016). 
 63 A.C. Mulligan et. al., David Ricardo and Comparative Advantage, IANG BLOG, 
http://iang.org/free_banking/david.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2016). These assumptions in-
clude the following the following: 
There are no transport costs. Costs are constant and there are no economies of scale. There 
are only two economies producing two goods. The theory assumes that traded goods are 
homogeneous (i.e., identical).  Factors of production are assumed to be perfectly mobile. 
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theory generally states that comparative advantage serves as the fundamental 
component and deciding factor behind international trade.64 Ricardo’s theory is 
important in international telecommunications because it provides the econom-
ic reasoning behind the first world’s decision to under-invest in the third 
world.65 The first world has a comparative advantage in both research and de-
velopment (“R&D”) of new telecommunications technologies, as well as their 
addition to existing infrastructure.66 Thus, it is more efficient for them to simp-
ly provide the third world with already-developed technologies than to provide 
them with the funding to develop it on their own. The processes of learning by 
doing and any positive externalities that may occur during R&D phases are 
therefore unavailable to the third world.67 The Reference Paper does not (and 
arguably cannot) deal with this issue.  The positive returns associated with the 
research, development, and implementation of telecommunications infrastruc-
ture are not fully comprehended by the Reference Paper and lead to a major 
disadvantage to the third world. 
Having set out the theory and the economics behind Michael Kremer’s the-
sis, this Comment will now discuss how the theory can specifically be applied 
to telecommunications infrastructure. 
With the proliferation of mobile devices on both a national and global scale 
and the constant development of newer and faster data networks,68 it is easy to 
see how a reliable telecommunications infrastructure is crucial for a develop-
ing economy.69 The O-Ring Theory of Economic Development applies to tele-
communications infrastructures as well as skill-level of labor.70 This portion of 
the analysis—proving that this theory applies to telecommunications—is rela-
tively straightforward. The more difficult part is deciding how to utilize that 
                                                                                                                 
There are no tariffs or other trade barriers. There is perfect knowledge, so that all buyers and 
sellers know where the cheapest goods can be found internationally. 
Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 See infra Part III. 
 66 See infra Part I. 
 67 See infra Part III. 
 68 Sébastien Page, AT&T to Launch 4G Network in 2011, IPHONE DOWNLOAD BLOG 
(Sept. 16, 2010), http://www.iphonedownloadblog.com/2010/09/16/att-to-launch-4g-
network-in-2011/. 
 69 See generally Lars-Hendrik Röller & Leonard Waverman, Telecommunications Infra-
structure and Economic Development: A Simultaneous Approach, 91 THE AM. ECON. REV. 
909 (2001) (discussing the effects of telecommunications on the economy of countries). 
 70 See generally Kremer, supra note 1 (establishing that something is an o-ring when, if 
it fails, it can be catastrophic to a developing economy). Technically, many things can be o-
rings in any given economic situation.  I am limiting my analysis to show that currently 
telecommunications are an economic staple but the general concept, when broadly defined, 
can apply to various inputs. 
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knowledge. Thus, Part II, Section I will focus on strictly applying Kremer’s 
theory to telecommunication infrastructures in third world countries.71 Section 
II will then begin to analyze what can be done with this information. Specifi-
cally, this Comment will examine what incentives are present to assist devel-
oping countries in realizing the criticality of a reliable and stable telecommuni-
cations infrastructure. 
Telecommunication and Economic Growth 
We all have cell phones. As of 2010, there are five billion cellular connec-
tions (essentially, cell phones) worldwide,72 and it is estimated that 70% of the 
global population owns a cell phone based on the number of cell phones sold.73 
We all use the Internet; from 2005 to 2008, Internet usage in the United States 
alone rose roughly ten percent,74 and global Internet usage rose 444.8% from 
2000 to 2010.75 Rapid dissemination of information is becoming necessary for 
any developing economy. It is insufficient to show, simply, that telecommuni-
cations are becoming important. It must be both necessary and positively cor-
related to economic development before asserting that it is a catalyst for 
growth. Röller and Waverman studied the global penetration rate of telecom-
munication infrastructures and plotted that information in an econometric 
model against gross domestic product (“GDP”) growth.76 They found there is a 
positive correlation between telecommunication infrastructure and GDP 
growth.77 However, a positive correlation is not enough—there must also be 
causation.78 To assert causation, they examined the impact that investment in, 
                                                 
 71 See infra Part II. 
 72 Over 5 billion mobile phone connections worldwide, BBC.COM (July 9, 2010), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10569081. Astonishingly, twenty percent of all new cell phone 
connections occurred in the 18 months between January 2009 and July 2010, and it is pre-
dicted that another one billion connections will be made before 2012. 
 73 Cell Phone Statistics-The Growth of Mobile, MOBILECAUSE.COM (Dec. 15, 2010), 
https://www.mobilecause.com/cell-phone-statistics. 
 74 Andrew Perrin & Maeve Duggan, Americans’ Internet Access: 2000-2015, PEW RES. 
CTR. (June 26, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/06/26/americans-internet-access-
2000-2015. 
 75 Internet Usage Statistics, INTERNET WORLD STATS, 
http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last updated June 30, 2016). 
 76 Röller, supra note 69 (using a structural model that closely examines telecommunica-
tions investment). 
 77 Id. (conducting several studies to determine the impact of telecommunications infra-
structure on economic growth in various forms). 
 78 The causation does not need to be positive, however; the correlation does. This is a 
subtle distinction that will become important later on in the comment. For example, finding 
a positive correlation between properly functioning o-rings and successful shuttle launches 
would not prove difficult; they are positively correlated.  Conversely, when an o-ring fails, a 
shuttle launch has a lower chance of success. This relationship only becomes apparent, 
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and proliferation of, telecommunications infrastructure has on a growing econ-
omy.79  Their results include investment leading to: 
Growth because its products—cable, switches, and so forth—lead to in-
creases in the demand for the goods and services used in their production. In 
addition, the economic returns on to telecommunications infrastructure invest-
ment are much greater than the returns on just the telecommunications invest-
ment itself.  Where the state of the telephone system is rudimentary, communi-
cations between firms is limited…As the telephone system improves, the costs 
of doing business fall, and output will increase for individual firms in individu-
al sectors of the economy. ‘If the telephone does have an impact on a nation’s 
economy, it will be through the improvements of the capabilities of managers 
to communicate with each other rapidly over increased distances.’ Thus, tele-
communications infrastructure investment and derived services provide signif-
icant benefits; their presence allows productive units to produce better…it has 
been argued that telecommunications investments have important spillovers 
and create externalities.80 
Both the direct and spillover effects81 of investment in telecommunications 
infrastructure are substantial. 
To support the thesis of a correlated relationship without direct proof of a 
causal relationship, analogies can be used. Restricting the analysis to economic 
development leads to a few interesting examples. The first example is labor, 
which is positively correlated to economic growth, and without which an 
economy cannot survive.82 Similarly, an economy cannot grow in the twenty-
                                                                                                                 
however, when the latter occurs. The o-ring must fail in order to observe their true connec-
tion. This is the natural relationship between any necessary but insufficient input, such as a 
telecommunications infrastructure. Thus, we will see the correlation but examine the under-
lying data to trust (for lack of a better word) that a causal relationship exists. 
 79 Röller, supra note 76. 
 80 Id. at 909-10 (stating that various studies support the notion that “[i]t is a common 
conception that a modern communications system is essential to development.”); Nathanial 
H. Leff, Externalities, Information Costs, and Social Benefit-Cost Analysis for Economic 
Development: An Example from Telecommunications, 32(2) Economic Development and 
Cultural Change 255 (Jan. 1984). 
 81 Spillover effects are, generally speaking, externalities. See, e.g., Adam B. Jaffe, Eco-
nomic Analysis of Research Spillovers Implications for the Advanced Technology Program, 
ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM (Dec. 1996), http://www.atp.nist.gov/eao/gcr708.htm; 
see also Externality defined as “A consequence or side effect of one’s economic activity, 
causing another to benefit without paying or to suffer without compensation”. –Also termed 
spillover… Externality, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 82 This idea presents the intriguing question of how an economy, within the strict defini-
tion of the word, can exist with a very limited (single digit) work force. The answer will rely 
on fact that, for this example, it is assumed that an economy can exist with zero workers. An 
economy cannot exist with zero workers. The impossibility proves the notion that a neces-
sary condition (here, certain limited inputs in economic development) exists even if the 
2017] Telecommunications Infrastructure 77 
first century without a reliable telecommunications infrastructure. An econo-
my, by definition,83 has never existed without even a rudimentary telecommu-
nications system and by showing through positive correlations that increased 
investments and efficiencies in infrastructure lead to economic development, it 
can be positively asserted that we have discovered another O-Ring. 
Application of the Telecommunication Theory 
Once it is evident that a telecommunications infrastructure is an O-Ring in 
economic development, the analysis must necessarily shift from one of discov-
ery to one of application. Essentially, how can we apply this information? 
There are several important points to be made in this section. First, the ques-
tion must be asked of how much government regulation and incentivizing is 
necessary for a developing economy to properly grow. Second, a discussion of 
private versus public sector involvement in this process is compulsory. The 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) answered these questions by 
creating the Reference Paper, to which around 75 countries have already ad-
hered.84 
Government Regulation and Incentives 
Applying an appropriate amount of government regulation in international 
telecommunications is a difficult balance to strike.  Just as most parents strive 
to strike a balance between draconian methods of regulating a child’s behavior 
and a more laissez faire method of allowing self-teaching with the inevitable 
mistake, governments of developing economies should strike a balance be-
tween over- and under-regulation of their expanding telecommunications infra-
structure. On the one hand, with too much regulation comes the possibility of 
limited development of new technologies and methods that might be present in 
a state of competition.85 On the other hand, a state of complete deregulation in 
                                                                                                                 
causation relationship cannot be directly proven due to a lack of direct evidence. An econo-
my has never existed which consisted of zero workers, yet it can be asserted that a work-
force, irrelevant of skill level, is positively correlated with economic development. 
 83 Economy is defined as: the management or administration of the wealth and re-
sources of a community”. Economy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). This im-
plies that a transfer of information, whether, as was the case in historic barter economies, 
through verbal exchange in person or, more modernly, through a telecommunications net-
work, is necessary. 
 84 Guermazi, supra note 32, at 25 n.2. 
 85 POSNER, supra note 40, at 288-89 (discussing monopoly as a form of regulation in-
volving patents, and how a market with more than one firm in a perfect state of competition 
is more likely to try and innovate from a technological standpoint than a market in which 
one firm controls the sole means of production). 
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the area of building an infrastructure might lead to the problems associated 
with natural monopoly present in any infrastructure,86 such as misguided incen-
tives. The pros and cons of government regulation in this area will be dis-
cussed, but this Comment asserts that limited regulation, coupled with compe-
tition, is the optimal strategy to handle the rigors of maturation associated with 
establishing a technological infrastructure. With the continuing globalization of 
telecommunications, there is support finding that international regulation is 
necessary to combat natural forces that could undermine the third world’s 
chances of competing with the developed countries. The United Nations (U.N.) 
has investigated this issue and responded by enabling the ITU to combat these 
problems.87 The goal of the ITU is “to get everyone to work together – gov-
ernment and industry alike – to come up with solutions that work: for sharing 
knowledge, developing tools, and building and safeguarding networks.”88 The 
ITU is necessary to ensure an equal playing field for all countries,89 and has 
burdened itself with the responsibility of ensuring that developing countries 
have sufficient telecommunications infrastructure to stay competitive global-
ly.90 With respect to international aid, communications and transportation in-
frastructure is the highest subset of aid from the World Bank, above energy, 
agriculture, and education.91  Thus, it is clear the World Bank, as well as the 
                                                 
 86 Wei Li & Lixin Colin Xu, Note, The Impact of Privatization and Competition in the 
Telecommunications Sector around the World, 47 J.L. & ECON. 395, 400 (Oct. 2004) (stat-
ing “Most economists . . . argue that that privatization works best when there is competition 
that limits the market power of the incumbent(s). Competition is thus seen as a complement 
of privatization.”). 
 87 See generally About ITU, ITU, 
http://www.itu.int/newsroom/press_releases/aboutitu.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2016) (stat-
ing that the ITU has been in existence for over 145 years and has “coordinated the shared 
global use of the radio spectrum, promoted international cooperation in assigning satellite 
orbits, worked to improve telecommunications infrastructure in the developing world, estab-
lished the worldwide standards that foster seamless interconnection of a vast range of com-
munications systems and addressed the global challenges of our times, such as mitigating 
climate change and strengthening cybersecurity.”) (emphasis added) [hereinafter About 
ITU]. 
 88 ITU vision statement, ITU, https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Climate-
Change/Documents/S-GEN-CLIM-2008-11-PDF-E.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2016). 
 89 See generally Building global communication frameworks for all, ITU, 
http://www.itu.int/net/newsroom/CIS/2009/backgrounders/global_communication.aspx (last 
visited Oct. 26, 2016) (stating ITU “has also successfully regulated worldwide use of the 
radio-frequency spectrum, ensuring all international wireless communications remain inter-
ference-free to ensure the relay of vital information and economic data to all parts of the 
globe.”). 
 90 See About ITU, supra note 87. 
 91 See generally Financing for sustainable development, OECD.ORG, 
http://www.oecd.org/department/0,3355,en_2649_34447_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited 
Oct. 26, 2016). 
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ITU, view communications as a necessary element in development. Alterna-
tively, a course of action that could also be deemed favorable to the expansion 
of a reliable telecommunications infrastructure is full privatization in both the 




Privatizing entire industries has been both beneficial and devastating to 
economies.93 As with most evaluations, there are valid points to be made on 
both sides of the debate. With privatization and deregulation come increased 
incentives to research and develop more efficient methods of production and 
distribution.94 In his book, Judge Posner explains the various attributes of de-
regulation (as most economists do), while recognizing the need for government 
regulation and ownership in certain areas.95 Coincidentally, one of the exam-
ples that Judge Posner provides is on point: 
What is the demand for deregulation? A clue is the competing 
away of regulation-induced profits in the airline industry. A 
more general cause is technological change, which in recent dec-
ades has favored competition; think of the effect of the cell 
phone, fiber optic cables, and the Internet on telephone service.96 
The ITU acknowledges the trends of privatization and competition, as well 
as the need for minimal levels of government ownership and regulation.97 
                                                 
 92 Privatization, used herein, means strict privatization, as the word is defined in Black’s 
Law Dictionary (“The act or process of converting a business or industry from governmen-
tal ownership or control to private enterprise.”) Privatization, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
1390 (10th ed. 2014), and in close relation, also used is the term, deregulation. 
 93 For example, the global market collapse in 2008 was due, in part, to the under-
regulation of the financial services industry which led to the “simultaneous mortgage default 
of thousands of homeowners.” Yusuf Yusuf, Moment of Clarity: A Centrist Approach to 
Mortgage Lending, 12 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 267, 269 (2013). 
94 POSNER, supra note 40, at 385 (examining both the fall in real prices for tickets and in-
creased airline traffic that resulted from deregulation of the airline industry in the 1970s). 
 95 See generally POSNER, supra note 40, at 385-86 (comparing industries such as “elec-
tric power generation” in which the government clearly does not possess a comparative 
advantage in terms of production to industries where the government may be able to provide 
better service such as “jails and prisons”). 
 96 Id. at 385. 
 97 See Joel Stratte-McClure, Privatization and Liberalization Set Off Big Bang, ITU 
(Oct. 13, 1999), https://www.itu.int/newsarchive/wtd/1999/iht10/tem-02.html (discussing 
worldwide trends of privatization and competition among companies in the world telecom-
munications sector); Gustavo Peña Quiñones, 
ITU/NBTC, Seminar on Telecommunications Regulatory Best Practices: Toward the Digital 
Economy Thailand, 40 (2015), https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Regional-
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The best approach in dealing with international telecommunications devel-
opment is to have privatization of the industry with substantial (but not bur-
densome) governmental regulation.98 The trend, however, is toward privatiza-
tion.99  For example, between 1980 and 1998 the percentage of countries with 
private telecommunications operators increased from 2% to 42%.100 Industries 
that require substantial and often prohibitive fixed costs show this kind of pri-
vatization growth very rarely.101 In a study involving 177 countries, Wei Li and 
Lixin Colin Wu econometrically examined the actual impact that privatization 
and competition has on the telecommunications sector around the world.102 In 
general, they found a positive correlation between privatization and economic 
growth.103 Their assertion, however, goes further to suggest that “full privatiza-
tion, which gave private owners control rights, were much more effective in 
improving performance than partial privatization, which left control rights in 
the hands of bureaucrats.”104 Their study only examines internal regulation; that 
is, regulation within each developing country.105 They fail to account for the 
possible effects that a global regulatory body, such as the ITU, might have on 
telecommunication development. Most of the reasons they give for the compet-
itive advantage of privatization over publicly owned enterprise,106 however, 
would hold true even under a global framework. For example, they cite the 
lack of incentive to monitor individuals for performance, as well as a general 
lack of incentive to reduce costs, as reasons why privatization shows increased 
returns.107 We have seen, however, that incentives can be provided to govern-
ment enterprises as well as corporations to lower costs and increase efficien-
cy.108  These incentives usually come in the form of tax breaks for utilizing 
                                                                                                                 
Presence/AsiaPacific/Documents/Events/2015/March-DigitalEconomy/Session1-
2_Gustova_Pe%C3%B1a-Qui%C3%B1ones.pdf (stating “the concept of minimal regulation 
should be prioritized when it comes to government regulation of Information, Communica-
tion, and Technology, worldwide). 
 98 This notion underlies the Reference Paper, but the paper has fallen short of providing 
the developing world adequate protection from predatory practices of first world countries. 
 99 Li, supra note 86, at 396. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. at 396-400. 
 102 Id. at 397. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. at 401-02. 
 106 For example, Ricardian principles. See generally Lauren F. Landsbur, Comparative 
Advantage, an Economics by Topic detail, LIBR. OF ECON. & LIB., 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Topics/Details/comparativeadvantage.html (last visited Nov. 
1, 20156); SURANOVIC, supra note 61, at Ch. 2.2. 
 107 Li, supra note 86, at 399-400. 
 108 See James Salzer, Lawmakers hand out tax breaks to some businesses, ATLANTA J. 
CONST. (Apr. 14, 2010), http://www.ajc.com/news/news/local-govt-politics/lawmakers-
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green energy, subsidies, and so forth.109  The incentives generally are from 
governments to private companies. Within the realm of the telecommunica-
tions industry, the incentive chain can run from international governing bodies 
through local governments to private firms. 
Governmental incentives are what is lacking from the Reference Paper, and 
what is lacking in international telecommunications law, to ensure that the de-
veloping world can economically compete with the developed world.110 Absent 
from any regulation, there would be sufficient incentives for the first world to 
invest in the developing world’s telecommunications network, however the 
amount of investment ensures that the third world remain below the first world 
in the ability to compete on an international level. 
PART II: COUNTER ARGUMENTS – LEAP-FROGGING AND 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER PROGRAMS 
Part II of this Comment will discuss the various counter arguments to the O-
Ring’s application to telecommunications development. Specifically, the ideas 
of leap-frogging and technological transfer programs are formidable opponents 
for an O-Ring analysis within the framework of international telecommunica-
tions development. 
Leap-Frogging 
As an alternative to requiring developing economies to repeat every step of 
the growing process, the concept of leap-frogging would allow these econo-
mies to learn from their developed counterparts and avoid some growing 
pains.111 Leap-frogging would allow third world countries to “take-off” from a 
state of early development to competing on a global level.112 This concept is a 
counter argument to the O-Ring theory, because this Comment asserts that de-
veloping economies will never be able to catch up to advanced economies due 
to increasing returns on investment to telecommunications infrastructure, 
whereas the leap-frogging theory asserts that “developing countries can jump 
some steps and avoid having to go through stages experienced by the present 
                                                                                                                 
hand-out-tax-breaks-to-some-businesses/nQsbW/ (explaining how some businesses were 
offered tax breaks for building tourist attractions, entertainment centers, golf courses, etc.). 
 109 Id.; see also Jim Abrams & Associated Press, Renewable energy firms clamor for tax 
breaks, ABC NEWS, http://abcnews.go.com/Business/story?id=5696908&page=1 (last visit-
ed Sept. 14, 2016) (stating how individuals were also targeted for special tax breaks). 
 110 See infra Part III. 
 111 A.S. Bhalla, Note, Can ‘High’ Technology Help Third World ‘Take-Off’?, 22 ECON. 
& POL. WKLY. 1082, 1082 (1987). 
 112 Id. 
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advanced countries.”113 Proponents of theoretical leap-frogging agree that in-
creasing returns exist absent their theory.114 They assert that “[u]nless the third 
world countries introduce high technology in their export-oriented industries 
… they are unlikely to retain or capture export markets.”115 Third world coun-
tries can utilize the concept of leap frogging to counteract this partially out-
come-determinative disadvantage. 
According to the theory, it is somewhat intuitive that leap-frogging is made 
easier when third world countries invest less in infrastructure because they can 
then jump from one stage to a more advanced one more easily.116 In practice, 
however, it actually is beneficial in the long term for third world countries to 
invest more in domestic infrastructure because they will have better systems in 
place and can leap-frog further than they would otherwise.117 
Leap-frogging presents an interesting conundrum. This counterargument as-
sumes away a foundational element of this Comment. According to A.S. Bhal-
la, “it assumes that the indigenous technology capability is at a stage where 
high technology can be assimilated and efficiently utilised [sic], and some 
components of it can be domestically produced.”118 This seemingly minor as-
sumption brushes away this Comment’s major premise. The argument that 
high technology can be easily assimilated into third world countries assumes 
that there is already sufficient technology in place upon which high technology 
can be built. Therefore, it naturally follows that those countries that already 
have a semi- to fully-reliable telecommunications infrastructure can more easi-
ly leap-frog whereas those countries in the early stages of development will 
suffer from smaller jumps. In certain conditions, this situation demonstrates 
increasing returns to investment on infrastructure, which will further the O-
Ring problem. Thus, although leap-frogging serves as an interesting counter 
argument to this Comment’s thesis, this fatal assumption ultimately serves as 
an Achilles’ heel. 
                                                 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. at 1083. 
 115 Id. 
 116 See, e.g., id. (“A dilemma faced by the third world policy-makers is to strike a good 
balance between domestic technological development and imports of technology from 
abroad.”). Thus, it is reasonable to assume that it might be efficient for policy makers to 
invest less in domestic infrastructure and instead focus on importing technology in an at-
tempt to use that technology to leap-frog. 
 117 See Bettina Gransow, Chinese Infrastructure Investment in Latin America-an As-
sessment of Strategies, Actors and Risks, 20 J. OF CHINESE POL. SCI. 267, 268 (2015) (for 
example, China investing in its infrastructure resulted in high economic growth). 
 118 Bhalla, supra note 111, at 1083. 
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Technology Transfer Programs 
The idea behind technology transfer programs is the natural incentive that 
first world countries have to invest in third world countries.119 The developed 
country has an incentive to donate technology to under-developed countries so 
that its own network functions more efficiently and on a broader level. Coun-
tries do this for many reasons, but mainly because it is advantageous to them in 
the long term to have compatible and reliable grids globally, across many tech-
nological disciplines.120 It becomes easier to market a cell phone, for example, 
if the purchaser/user is assured that their phone will work on cellular grids all 
over the world.121 The Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) investment in 
flight systems of various countries is another example of tech transfer.122 Alt-
hough most of this Comment is dedicated to cellular and Internet infrastruc-
tures, satellite grids and updates are just as much a part of the global telecom-
munications network. The FAA is “moderniz[ing] the national airspace from a 
ground radar system to satellite-based GPS technology.”123 This new technolo-
gy and method will be known as the Next Generation Air Transportation Sys-
tem (NextGen).124 NextGen will allow pilots to communicate via a superior 
satellite-based grid system, as opposed to the current cellular system.125 To re-
alize all the benefits that the system is designed to provide, the system must 
have global support.126 The benefits of sharing this new technology include 
easier flight paths when flying internationally, the need for only one flight sys-
tem on each plane, and simpler training for pilots on the new software.127 This 
donation is considered a technology transfer because the NextGen software 
was developed and largely utilized in the United States, yet it will be imple-
mented in many countries all over the world.128 This sort of technology transfer 
                                                 
 119 See id. at 1085 (explaining how often, First World occupants often want to share new 
technologies with poorer countries that otherwise would not be able to afford them). 
 120 Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act, Hearing on Reauthorization and Reform of 
the Federal Aviation Administration and the Airport Improvement Program Before the Sub-
comm. on Aviation of the Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure H.R., 112th Cong. 30 (2011) 
[hereinafter Century of Aviation] (statement of Hon. Randolph Babbitt, Administrator of the 
FAA). 
 121 One sees the emergence of certain apps aimed at tracking the experience with particu-
lar wireless carriers to give the consumer more power when choosing cell phone plans. See, 
e.g., About Us, SENSORLY, http://www.sensorly.com/about-us (last visited Oct. 26, 2016) (an 
example of an app that enables its users to track their wireless connectivity). 
 122 Century of Aviation, supra note 120. 
 123 NextGen Works, FAA.GOV, https://www.faa.gov/nextgen/works/#content (last visited 
Sept. 12, 2016). 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Century of Aviation, supra note 120. 
 127 Id. at 34. 
 128 Id. at 74. 
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arguably can assist third world countries in their attempts to catch up to the 
developed world within the realm of telecommunications.129 
This assertion presents a counter argument to this Comment because it pos-
tulates that first world countries have an incentive to assist third world coun-
tries in gaining ground in the developmental race.130 An interesting economic 
note to this theory is the fact that natural market forces are at work; no interna-
tional enforcement is necessary to ensure that technology is transferred and 
thus standard Ricardian theory can explain these transfers.131 The comparative 
advantage, encouraging countries to produce goods at a lower cost, compara-
tive to the same good made in another country,132 weighs in favor of the devel-
oped country. The reason developed countries have the comparative advantage 
is because technology already exists upon which to build further improve-
ments. 
That argument, however, has flaws. Technology transfer programs are bene-
ficial to third world countries; this is undeniable.133 Undoubtedly, third world 
countries are placed in a better position due to the charity of the first world 
countries. People will be more likely to travel to countries if they know their 
cell phone will operate properly;134 airlines are incentivized to reduce prices on 
flights to destinations where NextGen will be installed;135 tourism will increase 
in countries that have Internet access.136 The flaw comes from a process called 
learning-by-doing,137 which enables those conducting purposeful research not 
only to gain from their directed goal, but also to discover new ideas or process-
                                                 
 129 Bhalla, supra note 111, at 1082-83. 
 130 See generally id. at 1084 (describing the persuasiveness of policy considerations 
when making decisions that influence the pace and direction of technological change in 
small and large countries). 
 131 See generally Murray N. Rothbard, The Ricardian Law of Comparative Advantage, 
MISES DAILY ARTICLES (Apr. 26, 2012), https://mises.org/library/ricardian-law-
comparative-advantage (defining the Ricardian Model as a model of international trade 
introduced by David Ricardo and explaining comparative advantage). In this case, the com-
parative advantage of the developed national would be the ability to perform superior re-
search and development.  However, herein lies the flaw to this possible rebuttal argument of 
tech transfer; the developed country is ‘learning-by-doing,’ whereas the developing country 
just utilizes the new technology and gains from no positive externalities. 
 132 Id. 
 133 See generally Bhalla, supra note 111. 
 134 Röller, supra note 69, at 910 n.3. 
 135 Century of Avaiation, supra note 120, at 71 (statement of Olas E. Calio, President & 
CEO of Air Transp. Ass’n of Am.). 
 136 Craig Standing, et al., The Impact of the Internet in Travel and Tourism: A Research 
Review 2001-2010, 31 J. of TRAVEL & TOURIST MKT., 82, 82-83 (Jan. 23, 2014). 
 137 Dr. Henning Troll & Dr. Thomas Stahlecker, Fraunhofer ISI, Europe’s Regional Re-
search Systems: Current Trends and Structures, EUR. RES. AREA 7, 8 (2009), 
http://ec.europa.eu/invest-in-research/pdf/download_en/kf2008.pdf. 
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es along the way. Troll and Stahlecker state, “examples from basic research 
demonstrate that not all knowledge derived from research is an immediately 
relevant input to innovation processes. It does, however, add to the knowledge 
base and may become relevant in the long term.”138 A great example of the 
learning-by-doing process is the Internet itself.139 
The Internet was an ‘invention’ of the military, but began to be applied in 
ways not originally intended.140 Researchers in the United States learned that 
by working with military communication, something much greater could de-
velop.141 Thus, if the United States were to share the military communications 
with another country so that it connected the armed forces around the globe, 
then that would be considered technology transfer. The domestic developments 
in Internet connectivity, as a result of targeted research, occurred by ‘doing.’ 
Herein lies the shortcoming of the technology transfer argument. Although the 
developing country benefits by being provided with superior technology, the 
developed country: (1) already has the technology that was given, and (2) can 
learn from their original developments, a possibility absent from third world 
nations. Thus, although technology transfer programs can be helpful to devel-
oping countries in the short term, it will not assist them in the long term and 
may ultimately exacerbate their inability to catch up in global telecommunica-
tions development. 
Another example of how technology transfers are ineffective for purposeful 
GDP growth is seen in recent ITU statistics regarding their relationship.142 Ac-
cording to the ITU, the least technologically developed country in the world is 
Myanmar.143 Focusing specifically on cellular penetration in Myanmar, the 
country is only twenty-four years behind the most developed country in terms 
of telecommunication development, Sweden.144 This could, in part, be due to 
                                                 
 138 Id. 
 139 See generally Vinton Cerf, How the Internet Came to Be, NETVALLEY (1993), 
http://www.netvalley.com/archives/mirrors/cerf-how-inet.html (describing how experiment-
ing with voice compression led to the separation of Transmission Control Protocol from 
Internet Protocol and later, User Datagram Protocol). 
 140 See Barry M. Leiner et al., Brief History of the Internet 2-3 INTERNET SOC’Y, 
http://www.internetsociety.org/sites/default/files/Brief_History_of_the_Internet.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 22, 2016) (describing how independent researchers developed the concept of the 
internet and then reached out to the military for funding to implement their ideas). 
 141 Id. at 7 (describing how government suggestions of incorporating Internet protocols 
into supported operating systems led to widespread use of the Internet as we know it today). 
 142 ITU, The World in 2009: ICT Facts and Figures: A Decade of ICT Growth Driven by 
Mobile Technologies 4 http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/material/Telecom09_flyer.pdf [herein-
after The World in 2009] (last visited Sept. 12, 2016) (using this chart to explain how de-
spite the prevalence of technology transitions such as mobile device users in developing 
countries, this transition has little effect the overall GDP of the country). 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. 
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the fact that Sweden and other developed countries invested in a global tele-
communications network, which would help Myanmar.145 In terms of economic 
development, however, Myanmar remains over 160 years behind in terms of 
GDP per capita.146 This demonstrates the importance of assisting countries in 
their telecommunication programs. It also shows, however, the importance of a 
sophisticated network and the levels of return that can be gained by relatively 
slight advantages in telecommunications infrastructure (and, thus, an inability 
to catch up). 
Both counter arguments presented in this Comment are commendable as in-
dividual theories, but are both lacking in their ability to properly deal with de-
velopmental issues presented with international telecommunications infrastruc-
ture.147 Taken to their logical extremes, they can even be seen to worsen the 
problem.148 That problem, this Comment asserts, is that normal market forces 
and standard Ricardian incentives create a situation in which third world coun-
tries will be unable to catch up to first world countries in their economic de-
velopment. Leap-frogging and technology transfer programs both arguably 
place the developing country in a better position than they would be otherwise; 
however, this Comment deals in relative terms, not absolute terms.149 The issue 
of “catching up,” as defined in this Comment, is necessarily relative in nature; 
every country in the world might be “improving” or “developing,” but it is 
their position relative to the whole that matters. In this sense, both the leap-
frogging and technology transfer theories fail to properly deal with the issue of 
relative growth of the already-developed countries when compared to their 
lesser-developed counterparts. Thus, the need for a regulatory body such as the 
ITU to combat the natural market forces is clear, and becomes further clarified 
by a case study of Cameroon. 
PART III – CASE EXAMPLE: CAMEROON 
Cameroon serves as a good case study for this Comment for several reasons.  
First, it demonstrates the characteristics of a third world country.150 The GDP 
                                                 
 145 Lars Hulkrantz, Telecommunications Liberalization in Sweden: Is “Intermediate” 
Regulation Viable?, 9 SWED. ECON. POL’Y REV. 133, 157-58 (2002). 
 146 The World in 2009, supra note 142, at 4. 
 147 See infra Part II. 
 148 See infra Part II. 
 149 Absolute and Relative, ENCYC. OF MARXISM, 
https://www.marxists.org/glossary/terms/a/b.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2016). 
 150 The Third World is defined as a developing country, or 
[t]he group of nations (esp. in Africa and Asia) not aligned with major powers, whether 
Western democracies (i.e., the First — or Free — World) or countries that were formerly 
part of the Soviet bloc (i.e., the Second World). Although Third World nations are often 
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of Cameroon ranked 97th in the world, at $72.74 billion in 2015.151 By compari-
son, the United States ranked third in the world (behind China and the Europe-
an Union152) at $18.040 trillion.153 Second, telecommunications investment in 
Cameroon is lacking.154 Only about seventeen percent of the international aid 
directed toward Cameroon is focused on the category of “economic infrastruc-
ture and services.”155 Thus, there is enough of an incentive from the U.N. and 
from other nations to invest in Cameroon’s telecommunications infrastructure, 
but insufficient incentive to allow full development. Third, Cameroon fits the 
Comment well because it has demonstrated positive GDP growth over the last 
decade, but not enough to be able to compete internationally.156 Said another 
way, it is moving forward, but still falling behind. The average annual GDP 
growth for all African countries for the past decade is 5.2%.157 This annual per-
centage has steadily increased, at worst, remaining constant, over that time 
period.158 Cameroon, on the other hand, has had a maximum annual GDP 
                                                                                                                 
underdeveloped, the term Third World may denote only their political rather than their eco-
nomic status. 
Third World, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Developing Country is then 
defined as 
[a] country that is not as economically or politically advanced as the main industrial powers. 
Developing countries are located mostly in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, 
and Latin and South America. — Also termed developing state; underdeveloped country; 
less-developed country; Third World country. “Pertinent terminology has undergone exten-
sive changes in the past 40 years. At the very start, before the category found its way into 
official texts, economic and political writings referred mainly to ‘poor’ or ‘backward’ coun-
tries. In the late 1940s, the term ‘underdeveloped countries’ came into common usage in 
economic literature and in the jargon of international organizations. It was replaced in the 
1950s by the term ‘less developed countries,’ for which the current ‘developing countries’ 
was eventually substituted. These terms are essentially interchangeable as they refer to the 
same group and kind of countries. However, variations in the use of the term reflect signifi-
cant changes in the perception of the central issue, namely, economic development, as well 
as responses to justified sensitivities on the part of the countries principally concerned. 
Developing Country, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis added). 
 151 The World Factbook: Country Comparison: GDP (Purchasing Power Parity), 
CIA.GOV, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html#cm (last visited Oct. 22, 2016). 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. 
 154 OLIVIER NANA NZÈPA & ROBERTINE TANKEU KEUTCHANKEU, 2007 CAMEROON TELE-
COMMUNICATIONS SECTOR PERFORMANCE REVIEW, A SUPPLY SIDE ANALYSIS OF POLICY 
OUTCOMES 29 (2008) (ebook). 
 155 Aid at a Glance Charts, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., 
https://public.tableau.com/profile/thielemans.v#!/vizhome/shared/HCGM5YYF5 (last up-
dated Jan. 27, 2016). 
 156 UNECA, AFRICAN STATISTICAL YEARBOOK: 2010 118-20 (2010) (ebook). 
 157 Press Release, World Bank, Africa’s Growth Set to Reach 5.2 percent in 2014 With 
Strong Investment Growth and Household Spending (Apr. 7, 2014) (on file with author). 
 158 Id. 
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growth rate of 4.5%, and has demonstrated negative trends since that year.159 
Lastly, Cameroon has been a member of the ITU for 50 years.160 These four 
factors, (1) the proper labeling as a third world country, (2) insufficient amount 
of telecommunications infrastructure investment, (3) a relatively low GDP 
growth rate, and (4) membership in the ITU, enable an assertion concerning 
the proper application of this Comment’s thesis to Cameroon. 
This Comment asserts that insufficient investment in telecommunications 
infrastructure in third world countries, by first world countries and internation-
al organizations alike, is contributing to an increasing and likely-
insurmountable gap in economic growth. Cameroon, and countries like it, 
demonstrates the four factors necessary to fit squarely into this hypothesis. 
To place this Comment’s argument on more solid footing, Cameroon is 
fighting an uphill battle to stay competitive in the global economic battle due 
to its lack of internal and external investment in telecommunications.161 The 
ITU, by its own admission, does not provide sufficient support for telecommu-
nications development in countries like Cameroon.162 The main issue with 
countries such as Cameroon—and all third world countries for that matter—is 
that agencies such as the ITU evaluate their situation with an eye toward inter-
nal control and regulatory schemes, while acknowledging (yet brushing aside) 
the importance of international cooperation.163 This contradiction is where all 
of the problems, and this Comment itself, lie. Multinational organizations can-
not simultaneously recognize the proliferation of the global telecommunica-
                                                 
 159 In other words, the GDP growth rate of Cameroon demonstrates a negative second 
derivative. See UNECA, supra note 156 (depicting the downward trend of GDP growth in 
Cameroon in a chart with other African countries also represented). 
 160 See generally List of Member States, ITU, http://www.itu.int/cgi-
bin/htsh/mm/scripts/mm.list?_search=ITUstates&_languageid=1 (last visited Oct. 22, 2016) 
(depicting member states of ITU and their dates of entry). 
 161 To be fair, Cameroon has shown a higher annual GDP growth rate in telecommunica-
tions than any other sector in its economy. See UNECA, supra note 156, at 119. Their inter-
nal GDP of 500 million CFA Franc (about $1.1 million USD) per year from transportation 
and communications is significant in their own economy, however their entire internal in-
vestment on both the transportation and communication sectors is less than some private 
individual salaries in the United States. See, e.g., Morgan Stanley CEO gets pay worth $15.2 
million, CHARLESTON GAZETTE-MAIL (Apr. 17, 2011), 
http://www.wvgazettemail.com/ap/ApBusiness/201104170886. 
 162 ITU, AFRICA REGIONAL PREPARATORY MEETING FOR THE WORD TELECOMMUNICA-
TION DEVELOPMENT CONFERENCE (WTDC-02) YAOUNDÉ (CAMEROON) 6 (2001), 
http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/afr/WTDC02/PDFs/04e.pdf (stating that “[a]t the international 
level, ITU has not been closely involved in telecommunication sector reform. In the past 
eight years, it has provided some technical assistance but otherwise almost no support for 
telecommunication development projects in Cameroon, possibly because the Area Office in 
Yaoundé is not functioning.”). 
 163 Id. (arguing that, although the world is “shrinking,” Cameroon is simply “slow” to 
adapt to the changing environment). 
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tions environment, while simultaneously shirking responsibility for keeping the 
third world ‘up-to-date.’ The need for developing countries to engage in self-
help cannot be overstated; however, their internal assistance can only go so far. 
When the global telecommunications industry is structured in such an antitrust-
inducing manor, the need for a policy that encourages competitive behavior is 
crucial. Cameroon and all developing countries are feeling the reverberations 
of the ineffectiveness of the ITU. 
International organizations such as the ITU must treat this problem as if it 
were more heavily an antitrust issue and properly incentivize other internation-
al organizations and developed countries to invest in developing economies. 
Group boycotts, exclusionary practices, monopolization, and tying arrange-
ments are illegal under antitrust law, and should be more clearly condemned in 
the international telecommunications arena as well. Even though there has 
been relatively large internal investment by Cameroon in its domestic tele-
communications infrastructure, international incentive for aid is lacking. The 
U.N., in combination with the ITU, must act to combat this problem. 
CONCLUSION 
This Comment asserts that increasing returns to scale for telecommunica-
tions investment will lead to global economic dominance of first world coun-
tries. Standard Ricardian thinking will lead to under-investment on the part of 
global organizations and first world countries. Therefore, although the Refer-
ence Paper serves as a useful starting point for a theory of international equali-
ty, the problem needs to be dealt with as if it were an antitrust issue to incentiv-
ize the proper amount of investment. Organizations such as the ITU place too 
much emphasis on self-help and not enough on properly incentivizing the de-
veloped world to assist in allowing the third world to catch up. If incentives for 
the first world to invest in developing telecommunications infrastructures re-
main at their current levels, then developing economies will remain helpless, 
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Michael Kremer’s production function to solve for expected produc-
tion as a product of labor and labor skill is as follows:164 
 
-“E(y)” because it is expected production, not actual production 
-“B” is output per worker 
-“n” is the number of workers 
-“K” is capital 
-“q” is the skill of each worker 
 
TAKING REVENUE MINUS COSTS GIVES: 
 
- “w(q)” is the wage rate 
- “r” is the rental rate of capital 
 
                                                 
164 Kremer, supra note 1, at 553-56. 
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THE FIRST ORDER CONDITION YIELDS: 
 
 
- The derivative of the marginal product of skill for the i-th worker with 
respect to the skill of the other workers is positive: 
 
 
- Firms will bid the most for higher skilled workers. “Thus, in equilibri-
um, workers of the same skill are matched together in firms…”165 
- And, given that all workers pair up with those of similar ability, qi = qi 
for all j, we can re-write the F.O.C. as: 
 
 
- F.O.C. on capital implies that: 
 
- We find supply of k=k* by adding up the k demanded by firms for all 
the workers with skills from 0-1: 
                                                 
165 Id. at 554. 
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- Rearranging, we find that the rental rate of capital in equilibrium is: 
 
- Rearranging, we find that the rental rate of capital in equilibrium is: 
- With  
 
 
- Integrating like before, we find the wage schedule: 
 
- Here, “C” represents the wage of a worker who has skill=0. 
- Multiplying by n gives: 
 
 
αY is payment to capital, (1- α)Y is wage expense, thus 
profit = revenue – costs = 
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Y – αY – (1- α)Y = 0 
Thus, “. . . firms are indifferent as to the skill level of their workers as long as 
their labor force is of homogenous skill.”166 
 
Since equilibrium profit is zero, more capital is demanded for better-
skilled workers. Countries with better-skilled workers can be more efficient 
and use more capital, creating more output and increasing productivity even 
more.  These kinds of increasing returns are what create incentives to third-
world countries to engage in telecommunication infrastructure early-on in their 
development; they may never be able to catch up. 
                                                 
166 Id. at 556. 
